Aristotle on perceiving objects. by Marmodoro,  Anna
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
11 August 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
proof
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Marmodoro, Anna (2014) 'Aristotle on perceiving objects.', Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/aristotle-on-perceiving-objects-9780199326006?cc=gblang=en
Publisher's copyright statement:
Marmodoro, Anna (2012) 'The metaphysical foundations of perception.', in Aristotle on perceiving objects written by
edited by Anna Marmodoro. Oxford : Oxford University Press, pp. 3-30. Reproduced by permission of Oxford
University Press,
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/aristotle-on-perceiving-objects-9780199326006?cc=gblang=en
Additional information:
Sample pages from chapter 1 deposited: 'The metaphysical foundations of perception', pp. 3-30.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
3C h a p t e r  1
The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Perception
I n t roduCt Ion
One of the cornerstones of Aristotle’s theory of perception is that 
the world is truly as colorful as it looks to us, as noisy as it sounds 
to us, etc. By generalization, Aristotle holds that we perceive the 
world through the senses as it is; in other words, the contents of our 
perceptions are just like the real properties of the external objects 
we perceive.1 While there is scholarly consensus on Aristotle’s real-
ism with respect to perceptible qualities, a variety of ways of inter-
preting it have been put forward in the literature. This book makes 
an original contribution to the debate by motivating the view that 
Aristotle’s theory of perception is aligned with one of his most fun-
damental positions in metaphysics, namely that all properties are 
causal powers (δυνάμεις, potentialities), and that causation is to be 
accounted for in terms of powers and their activation (ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ 
or ἐνεργείᾳ, actuality).2 Thus, in the case of perception the percepti-
ble qualities of objects are real powers of the object to interact caus-
ally with the perceivers, and perception itself is the activation of the 
relevant powers in the perceiver by the objects of perception. The 
activation of the object’s perceptible qualities and the activity of 
the corresponding perceptual experience in the agent are mutually 
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dependent in a variety of ways, which are unique to Aristotle’s per-
ceptual realism.
Before exploring this view in more detail, it will be helpful to 
briefly introduce the key terms that will be relevant for the fol-
lowing discussion. The Aristotelian scholar might indeed already 
be surprised by my use of the terms ‘power’ for ‘potentiality’ on 
the one hand, and ‘activation’ for ‘actuality’ on the other. These 
are interpretative choices, and in some ways departures from the 
received tradition; I  will explain them presently. The Greek term 
δύναμις, as Aristotle uses it, refers to a property whose nature is 
defined in terms of the change it can bring about, or which it can 
allow its bearer to suffer. The most common English translation of 
δύναμις thus understood is ‘potentiality’. This translation, albeit 
well established, is unhelpful when we embark on an investigation 
of Aristotle’s views, for three main reasons. Firstly, it blurs the con-
ceptual distinction between the property itself, that is, the causal 
power, and the state it is in, because they both end up being referred 
to as ‘potentiality’. Secondly, it obscures the relevance of Aristotle’s 
view to contemporary metaphysics:  the term ‘potentiality’ does 
not figure in the contemporary discourse, although what it refers 
to in Aristotle is very much at the center of current discussion in 
metaphysics.3 Thirdly, it generates unnecessary difficulties for our 
understanding of what an activated power is. I thus propose to use 
the term ‘power’ as a translation of δύναμις when it refers to causal 
powers, and to use the term ‘potentiality’ when referring to the state 
that causal powers are in when not activated.
Some powers, for Aristotle, exist in nature ἐν δυνάμει or δυνάμει 
and others ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ or ἐνεργείᾳ. For these expressions I use the 
current translation ‘in potentiality’ or ‘potentially’, and ‘in actual-
ity’ or ‘actually’, respectively. While keeping to the standard trans-
lation, I offer however an original interpretation of what it is for a 
power to be in actuality. I argue that the actuality of a power is to 
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be interpreted as its state of activation; its exercising powerfulness. 
For Aristotle, a power does not cease to be powerful while acti-
vated, nor is its powerfulness reducible to mere potentiality, as we 
will see in more detail later. The powerfulness of a power is either 
the potentiality to bring about change, or the actuality of bring-
ing about change. That the powerfulness and the potentiality of a 
power are not reducible one to the other can be derived from the 
following stance Aristotle takes. He differentiates three states a 
subject s may be in in relation to a power:  s may have a power in 
potentiality (as in the case of a child having the power to learn to 
play soccer); s may have a power in first actuality (when the child 
has learned to play soccer); and s may have a power in second actu-
ality (when the child is playing soccer).4 For Aristotle some powers 
retain their potentiality only up to the state of first actuality, but 
not in second actuality. For example, when water is freezing and 
becoming an ice cube, in the first stages of this process the ice cube 
in the making is not actually fragile but can acquire the capacity 
to break if it cooled down more. When it is cooled down more the 
ice cube becomes harder and brittle, and can potentially break (e.g. 
by being crushed). Crushing it activates its brittleness, namely its 
power to break. When the ice cube is actively breaking it loses the 
potentiality to break. By contrast, other powers retain their potenti-
ality when in second actuality; for instance, the child’s potentiality 
to play soccer is preserved while playing soccer, namely while the 
power is activated. Aristotle explains:
Even the term ‘being acted upon’ is not used in a single sense, 
but sometimes it means a kind of destruction of something by 
its contrary, and sometimes rather a preservation of that which 
is potential by something actual which is like it, as potency is 
related to actuality. For when the one merely possessing knowl-
edge comes to exercise it, he is not altered (for the development 
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is into his real self or actuality), or else this is a different kind of 
alteration (DA 417b2–7)
οὐκ ἔστι δ’ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τισ 
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος 
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος, καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει 
πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν· θεωροῦν γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστήμην, 
ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (εἰς αὑτὸ γὰρ ἡ ἐπίδοσις καὶ εἰς 
ἐντελέχειαν) ἣ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως.
A power is powerful because of its relation to change—it can lead to 
change, or it engages in change that preserves it.5
1.1 A r Istot l e’s Pow er on tolog y
Aristotle’s power ontology, as briefly sketched thus far, bears on his 
theory of perception. For him, the perceptible qualities that charac-
terize the world around us are real causal powers objects have, as we 
will see in the next chapters. Why are powers so central to Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, and consequently to all domains of his investigation, 
including perception? How did he reach this view? Aristotle aims at 
a rational explanation of the world all the way down to the bedrock 
of reality. In the De Generatione et Corruptione he states that at this 
fundamental level of reality there are properties and bodies, and 
there is a rationale to the number of bodies and the way the proper-
ties are distributed among them. He writes,
The [fundamental] differences [i.e., properties] are reasonably 
distributed among the primary bodies, and the number of the 
latter is consonant with theory. (GC 330b6–7, my emphasis)
εὐλόγως διανέμεσθαι τὰς διαφορὰς τοῖς πρώτοις σώμασι, 
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἶναι κατὰ λόγον.
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In thinking about the properties that characterize the primary bodies, 
Aristotle narrows down the candidates for this role of fundamental 
property to the tangible contrarieties (GC 329b6–9), which for him are:
[Properties] . . . capable of acting [and] being affected . . . said of 
things in virtue of their acting upon something else or being 
acted upon by something else. (GC 329b21–22)
 . . .  ποιητικὰ . . . παθητικά . . . τῷ ποιεῖν τι ἕτερον ἢ πάσχειν 
ὑφ’ ἑτέρου λέγονται.
Clearly then for Aristotle these properties are powers: they are prop-
erties whose nature is to bring about or allow their bearer to suf-
fer change. Aristotle goes through an analysis of the list of tangible 
contrarieties, and concludes that they are all reducible to four pri-
mary or fundamental ones. These primary powers are heat, cold, 
wetness, and dryness:
It is clear . . . that all the other differences reduce to the first 
four, but that these admit of no further reduction . . . Hence 
these must be four. (GC 330a24–29)
Δῆλον . . . ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ἀνάγονται εἰς τὰς 
πρώτας τέτταρας. Αὗται δὲ οὐκέτι εἰς ἐλάττους . . . ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη 
τέτταρας εἶναι ταύτας.
These primary powers do not exist separately each on its own; they 
pair up and constitute the four simple elements:  namely fire, air, 
water, and earth:
Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist . . . and Water is 
cold and wet, while Earth is cold and dry. (GC 330b3–5)
τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ θερμὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ὁ δ’ ἀὴρ θερμὸν καὶ 
ὑγρόν . . . τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν.
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Aristotle holds that there are no other primary properties that 
any of the simple elements possesses in addition to the two con-
trary powers each simple element is qualified by. The simple ele-
ments can reciprocally transform into one another by gaining or 
losing their powers.6 For example the simple elements water and 
fire have two contrarieties each, and when they come in contact 
the interaction between them results in the heat of fire over-
powering the coldness of the water while the wetness of water 
overpowers the dryness of fire, giving rise to what is hot and wet, 
namely air. And when air loses its primary power of heat, which 
is replaced by the power of cold, it transforms into water again. 
Aristotle writes:
For these bodies [Fire, Water and the like] change into one 
another (they are not immutable as Empedocles and other 
thinkers assert, since alteration would then have been impos-
sible), whereas the contrarieties do not change. (GC 329a35–b3, 
my emphasis)
ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, καὶ οὐχ ὡς 
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ ἕτεροι λέγουσιν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀλλοίωσις), αἱ 
δ’ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ μεταβάλλουσιν.
There will be Air, when the cold of the Water and the dry 
of the Fire have passed away (since the hot of the latter and 
the moist of the former are left); whereas, when the hot of the 
Fire and the moist of the Water have passed-away, there will 
be Earth, owing to the survival of the dry of the Fire and the 
cold of the Water. So, too, in the same Way, Fire and Water 
will result from Air and Earth. For there will be Water, when 
the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth have passed-away 
(since the moist of the former and the cold of the latter are left); 
whereas, when the moist of the Air and the cold of the Earth 
have passed-away, there will be Fire, owing to the survival of 
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the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth—qualities constitu-
tive of Fire. (GC 331b14–24)
Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ὕδατος φθαρῇ τὸ ψυχρὸν τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς 
τὸ ξηρόν, ἀὴρ ἔσται (λείπεται γὰρ τοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δὲ 
τὸ ὑγρόν), ὅταν δὲ τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δ’ ὕδατος τὸ 
ὑγρόν, γῆ, διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι τοῦ μὲν τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν. 
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ 
τοῦ ἀέρος φθαρῇ τὸ θερμὸν τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ξηρόν, ὕδωρ ἔσται 
(λείπεται γὰρ τοῦ μὲν τὸ ὑγρὸν τῆς δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν), ὅταν δὲ τοῦ 
μὲν ἀέρος τὸ ὑγρὸν τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ψυχρόν, πῦρ, διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι 
τοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τῆς δὲ τὸ ξηρόν, ἅπερ ἦν πυρός.
The simple elements can combine between them in different 
proportions to make up more complex kinds of stuff. Thus the 
(instantiated) primary powers are the primitive (or basic) and 
fundamental building blocks of reality. The primary powers are 
primitive because they are not constituted of any further items as 
their building blocks. There are no items constituting the primary 
properties, and therefore there are no further items constituting 
the simple elements—air, water, earth, and fire—apart from their 
primary powers. On the other hand, they are fundamental because 
the primary properties, to which the other properties are reducible,7 
interact with each other in the cyclical transformations of the pri-
mary elements they constitute,8 thereby making up a structure of 
interacting powers that is the foundation of all there is in nature. 
In view of the fact that for Aristotle everything in physical nature 
is built out of the four simple elements and their mixtures, and the 
simple elements are built out of the primary properties, it follows 
that all there is in nature is built out of powers. All physical changes 
in nature derive from changes in the combinations of the primary 
powers. Since, on Aristotle’s view, powers require other powers 
to activate them, this gives rise to a net of interdependent powers, 
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which, ultimately, constitute everything in nature. It is a struc-
ture of dependences, not of relations between powers. Nor is it a 
structure of relations that constitute powers; dependence does not 
introduce relations or make powers relational entities in their con-
stitution. Furthermore, as we shall see, for Aristotle the manifesta-
tion of each power is intrinsic to the power itself. Being activated is 
simply exercising the powerfulness that defines what the power is.9
1.2 t h e n At u r e oF C AusA l Pow er s
In general terms, for Aristotle, a power is first and foremost the 
capacity to bring about change:
All potentialities that conform to the same type are starting 
points of some kind, and are called potentialities in reference 
to one primary kind, which is a starting point of change in 
another thing or in the thing itself qua other. (Met. 1046a9–11, 
my emphasis)10
ὅσαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, πᾶσαι ἀρχαί τινές εἰσι, καὶ πρὸς 
πρώτην μίαν λέγονται, ἥ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ 
ᾗ ἄλλο.
It is important to note from the start that Aristotle’s very explana-
tion of powers as being sources of change, and nothing other than 
that, commits him, albeit implicitly, to the view that all there is to 
a power is what it can do, or is doing. Nothing inert or impotent is 
needed in the power’s nature to anchor the power to reality.11 This 
commitment (which is shared by a number of contemporary power 
metaphysicians)12 is not uncontroversial;13 however, it is crucial to 
free Aristotle’s power ontology from any of the regresses that ensue 
for other power ontologies, as we will see later.
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In addition to the primary type of powers just mentioned, that 
is the active ones which can initiate change, for Aristotle there exist 
passive powers that are capacities to suffer change:
For one kind is a potentiality for being acted on (i.e., the princi-
ple in the very thing acted on) which makes it capable of being 
changed and acted on by another thing or by itself regarded as 
other. (Met. 1046a11–13)
ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι 
ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο.
Examples of such capacities or powers are, for example, fragility, or 
malleability, or flexibility, etc. For Aristotle being able to change is 
as much a capacity or power as being able to effect change, as he 
states:
In a sense the potentiality of acting and of being acted on is one 
(for a thing may be capable either because it can be acted on or 
because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the 
potentialities are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; 
it is because it contains a certain motive principle, and because 
even the matter is a motive principle, that the thing acted on 
is acted on . . . for that which is oily is inflammable; and that 
which yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly 
in all other cases. But the other potency is in the agent (e.g. 
heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can 
produce heat and the other in the man who can build). (Met. 
1046a19–28)
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μία δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ 
πάσχειν (δυνατὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δύναμιν τοῦ παθεῖν 
καὶ τῷ ἄλλο ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ), ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἄλλη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι 
(διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ἀρχήν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀρχήν τινα, 
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πάσχει τὸ πάσχον . . . τὸ λιπαρὸν μὲν γὰρ καυστὸν τὸ δ’ ὑπεῖκον 
ὡδὶ θλαστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), ἡ δ’ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, 
οἷον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομική, ἡ μὲν ἐν τῷ θερμαντικῷ ἡ δ’ ἐν 
τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ·
A notion that is distinctive to Aristotle’s account is conceiving of 
passive powers as originative sources of change (see Met. 1046a11–13; 
a23). It is natural for us to think that an originative source of change 
is a power to bring about change; but it is not as natural to think 
that an originative source of change is a capacity to suffer change. 
Yet Aristotle sees both active and passive powers as originative 
sources of change, the one as a source that changes something, and 
the other as a source of suffering change. In fact, Aristotle gives sev-
eral examples of originative sources of suffering change to make his 
point clear, such as, for example, oil or brittle matter.14 Both active 
and passive powers are mentioned in Aristotle’s definition of power 
in Met. V 12:
Things which are called capable (δυνατόν) in one sense will be 
those which originate change or alteration . . . in other things or 
qua other; in another sense, if something else possesses such 
capacity over them. (Met. 1019a33–b1)
καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον λεχθήσεται τὸ ἔχον κινήσεως 
ἀρχὴν ἢ μεταβολῆς . . . ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, ἕνα δ’ ἐὰν ἔχῃ τι 
αὐτοῦ ἄλλο δύναμιν τοιαύτην.
The former is the primary case for Aristotle; ‘the others are called 
capable either from something else’s possessing a capability of that 
kind over them, or from its not possessing it, or from its possessing 
it in a particular way’ (Met. 1020a2–4).
As I will argue below, it is a fundamental tenet for Aristotle that 
powers are dependent on other powers in order to be activated. For 
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example the solubility of salt requires salt to be placed in an appro-
priate liquid in order for it to dissolve. The position was first put 
forward by Heraclitus, endorsed by Plato,15 and then developed by 
Aristotle; interestingly it is gaining consensus among contempo-
rary metaphysicians too.16 But it is a distinctive Aristotelian view 
(and far from being a point of consensus among contemporary 
power metaphysicians) that active powers depend on passive pow-
ers for their activation (and vice versa). Aristotle defines an active 
power as one that exercises its powerfulness on a corresponding 
passive one.17 As I will argue below, the distinction between active 
and passive powers is pivotal for a sound account of causation, for it 
gives metaphysical underpinning to its asymmetry.18
1.3 C AusA l Pow er s I n ACt uA lIt y
Powers are capacities for change; the change is the end (τέλος) they 
are directed toward.19 For a power, reaching its end is exercising its 
powerfulness, and thereby becoming actual. Most importantly, for 
Aristotle the actuality of a power is its activation, namely a transi-
tion to a different status of the power itself.20 This new stage reached 
by the activated power is the causal activity the power is engaged in. 
For example, the power to heat when activated is heating something 
else. Aristotle in fact distinguishes between powers whose activa-
tion is an activity in the strict sense (ἐνέργεια, πρᾶξις), and others 
whose activation is a process (κίνησις). The powers whose ends are 
activities are realized instantaneously, such as in the case of the 
power to see; at any one moment one sees and has seen. The powers 
whose ends are processes are realized in stages, such as in the case 
of the power to build a house; while one is building a house, one has 
not built a house. Processes have a natural completion point: when 
the end of the process is reached, such as the completion of the 
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house; activities do not have a natural completion point (e.g., in 
the case of seeing). Strictly speaking Aristotle associates change 
with processes only, because in the case of processes the resulting 
state is qualitatively different from the initial state—as for instance 
in the case of heating (process), but not of seeing (activity).21 To 
make Aristotle’s point even clearer we might say that processes only 
have an output, while both processes and activities have an effect. 
Aristotle’s distinctions are mainly presented in the following text 
from the Metaphysics:
Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but all 
are relative to the end (e.g., the process of making thin is of this 
sort) and the things themselves when one is making them thin 
are in movement in this way (i.e., without being already that 
at which the movement aims), this is not an action or at least 
not a complete one (for it is not an end); but that in which the 
end is present is an action. For example, at the same time we 
are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have under-
stood, are thinking and have thought: but it is not true that at 
the same time we are learning and have learned, or are being 
cured and have been cured. At the same time we are living 
well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy. 
If not, the process would have had sometime to cease, as the 
process of making thin ceases: but, as it is, it does not cease: we 
are living and have lived. Of these processes, then, we must 
call the one set movements (κινήσεις), and the other actuali-
ties (ἐνεργείας). For every movement is incomplete—making 
thin, learning, walking, building—these are movements, and 
incomplete movements. For it is not true that at the same time 
we are walking [to a destination] and have walked [to the des-
tination], or are building and have built, or are coming to be 
and have come to be—it is a different thing that is being moved 
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and that has been moved, and that is moving [to a location] and 
that has moved; but it is the same thing that at the same time 
has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The lat-
ter sort of process, then, I call an actuality (ἐνέργεια), and the 
former a movement (κίνησις). What, and what kind of thing, 
the actual is, may be taken as explained by these and similar 
considerations. (Met. 1048b18–36)
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν 
περὶ τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὸ ἰσχναίνειν [ἡ ἰσχνασία] [αὐτό], αὐτὰ δὲ 
ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν κινήσει, μὴ ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ 
κίνησις, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε· οὐ γὰρ τέλος· ἀλλ’ 
ἐκείνη <ᾗ> ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος καὶ [ἡ] πρᾶξις. οἷον ὁρᾷ ἅμα <καὶ 
ἑώρακε,> καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε,> καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν, 
ἀλλ’ οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ’ ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται. 
εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν. εἰ δὲ 
μή, ἔδει ἄν ποτε παύεσθαι ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ, νῦν δ’ οὔ, ἀλλὰ 
ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν. τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ’ 
ἐνεργείας. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία μάθησις βάδισις 
οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα 
βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ’ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ 
γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον [καὶ 
κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν]· ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ 
καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ 
κίνησιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ποῖον, ἐκ τούτων καὶ 
τῶν τοιούτων δῆλον ἡμῖν ἔστω.
From the above text we learn that powers are actualized, accord-
ing to Aristotle, as either activities or processes. The difference 
between them is that processes have a beginning and an end 
which are different from each other, so completing the realiza-
tion of the end requires qualitatively different stages in a process; 
while in an activity the beginning and the end are the same, in a 
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continuous realization of the end. Since while a process is taking 
place it has not reached its end point yet, it can be thought of as a 
power in the process of being actualized, which is how Aristotle 
thinks about it. A process is an actuality, because the unfolding 
realization of its different stages is happening; but at the same 
time it is not fully realized, in so far as it has not reached its end 
yet. In that sense a change is an actual process in progress, real-
izing its remaining potential stages, as Aristotle explains in the 
Physics:
The actuality of the potential, qua potential, is change (e.g., the 
actuality of what is alterable as alterable, is alteration; of what is 
increasable and its opposite, decreasable (there is no common 
name for both), increase and decrease; of what can come to be 
and can pass away, coming to be and passing away; of what can 
be carried along, locomotion). That this is what change is, is 
clear from what follows: when what is buildable, in so far as we 
call it such, is in fulfillment, it is being built, and that is build-
ing. (Phys. 201a9–18, transl. slightly modified)
ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς 
ἐστιν, οἷον τοῦ μὲν ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ᾗ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἀλλοίωσις, τοῦ δὲ 
αὐξητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου φθιτοῦ (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄνομα κοινὸν 
ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν) αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, τοῦ δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ 
γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά. ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ 
κίνησις, ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον. ὅταν γὰρ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον 
αὐτὸ λέγομεν εἶναι, ἐντελεχείᾳ ᾖ, οἰκοδομεῖται, καὶ ἔστιν τοῦτο 
οἰκοδόμησις·
Some confusion might arise in reading the passage: it might appear 
that a power is potential before it is actualized, and again potential 
after it is actualized, as if there were unactualized and actualized 
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potential. To avoid confusion it is important to bear in mind the 
distinction drawn by Aristotle between the activation of a power—
that is, its realization—and the completion of the process of its real-
ization. Thus, the power of house building becomes actual when 
activated at the beginning of the house-building process, and con-
tinues to be in actuality until all the stages of house building are 
completed. Although in activities the end is reached as soon as the 
activity occurs, and sets no limits to the duration of the activity, in 
the case of changes the end is complex; the process has to be ini-
tiated and continue activated until the end point of the process is 
reached, completing the process:
While in some cases the exercise is the ultimate thing (e.g., in 
sight the ultimate thing is seeing, and no other product besides 
this results from sight), but from some things a product follows 
(e.g., from the art of building there results a house as well as the 
act of building), yet none the less the act [of seeing] is in the 
former case the end and in the latter [the act of house building 
is] more of an end than the mere potentiality [to build] is [even 
if it is less of an end than the completion of the house]. (Met. 
1050a24–27)
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις (οἷον ὄψεως ἡ ὅρασις, 
καὶ οὐθὲν γίγνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως), ἀπ’ 
ἐνίων δὲ γίγνεταί τι (οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν 
οἰκοδόμησιν), ὅμως οὐθὲν ἧττον ἔνθα μὲν τέλος, ἔνθα δὲ μᾶλλον 
τέλος τῆς δυνάμεώς ἐστιν·
The contrast is between the potentiality for building a house when 
nothing is being built, and the potentiality for building a house 
while a house is being built. The latter potentiality is the activa-
tion of the former potentiality, and has an end point that marks its 
full actualization. This is what the actuality of the potential qua 
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potential is—the actual process of building the house. During the 
building process, the power to build is as activated (and as actual) 
as is the power to see when one is seeing. Thus, when the power is 
actively doing what it is in its own nature capable of doing, then the 
power is actualized. Prior to this it exists but in a potential state. 
Thus the actuality of a power, whether for an activity or a process, is 
the activation of that power:22
That which is in the primary sense potential is potential 
because it is possible for it to become actual (e.g., I  mean by 
‘capable of building’ that which can build, and by ‘capable of 
seeing’ that which can see). (Met. 1049b12–16)
τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δῆλον (τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι 
ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρώτως δυνατόν, οἷον λέγω 
οἰκοδομικὸν τὸ δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν, καὶ ὁρατικὸν τὸ ὁρᾶν, 
καὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι·
Aristotle further distinguishes the activation of a power from the 
realization of the power’s end. The end of a power is given in the 
power’s definition:
That which is capable is capable of something and at some time 
in some way—with all the other qualifications which must be 
present in the definition. (Met. 1047b35–1048a2)
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατὸν τὶ δυνατὸν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πὼς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα 
ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ.
As mentioned above, for Aristotle, the actuality of a power is not a new 
property that comes about.23 Rather, it is the activation of the power, 
either as it is exercising its causal influence on the passive power or as 
the passive power is suffering that influence. For example, if a peach 
has the power to ripen in the heat, the ripening is the actualization 
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of active and passive powers at play in the environment and in the 
peach. The ripe state of the peach that comes about is the aftermath 
of the activation of the powers, not their manifestation, which is the 
ripening process. Similarly, in the case of a builder who has the power 
to build a house, the built house is the output of the activation of the 
active and passive powers in play in the circumstances.
For Aristotle a power in potentiality is the same power as that 
power in actuality (i.e., when it is activated). In other words, the 
difference between potential and actual power is not a numerical dif-
ference. This is a very important and distinctive tenet of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, whose philosophical soundness shows up clearly if we 
consider it in relation to three debates in the recent literature on 
power metaphysics. In brief, these issues are: firstly, whether pure 
power ontologies of the kind Aristotle endorses (where there is 
nothing categorical anchoring the powers to reality) are commit-
ted to a world of mere potentiality; secondly, whether powers have 
an essentially relational nature; and thirdly, in what sense a pow-
er’s directedness toward its manifestation is intrinsic to the power 
itself. I shall now examine each of these debates, showing in each 
case how Aristotle’s view makes a fresh contribution, and advances 
the contemporary debate.
To begin with, is Aristotle’s account vulnerable to the criticism 
that all there is or can be is potential, and that change is simply 
a transition from one potential state of the world to another such 
state? This is a problem faced by many contemporary power ontol-
ogies, sometimes referred to as the “Always packing, never travel-
ling” problem.24 David Armstrong formulates the problem thus:
Given purely dispositionalist accounts of properties, par-
ticulars would seem to be always repacking their bags as they 
change properties, yet never taking a journey from potency to 
act. (1997, 80)
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The problem stems from the position held by contemporary power 
ontologists whereby the manifestation of a power is a new power.25 
This position commits them to a network of powers in potentiality, 
as the activation of each power in potentiality is a transition to a new 
power in potentiality. Thus, nothing ever seems to be actualized. 
Avoiding a commitment to worlds of mere potentiality is precisely 
the worry that Aristotle’s position avoids. On his view, and in contrast 
to alternative views in the contemporary literature, the transition a 
power makes from being in potentiality to being in actuality does not 
amount to bringing about another power in potentiality. It is rather 
a transition the power makes to its own activated state. An activated 
power is the very same power as the power in potentiality, but is now 
manifesting (e.g., the power to heat actively heating something). A the-
ory of powers that did not allow them when activated to exercise their 
powerfulness would be rather odd indeed. For Aristotle powers that 
are exercising their powerfulness are actively bringing about change, 
and result in a new configuration of powers. But the exercise of power-
fulness is not the result, but rather the process toward the result. From 
this discussion it follows that for Aristotle the powerfulness of a power 
is not reducible to mere potentiality. (This addresses the first of the 
three issues in contemporary metaphysical debate mentioned above). 
Powerfulness is the potentiality to bring about or suffer change, but 
also the activity of bringing about or suffering change. Additionally, 
the activation of a power is neither the end of that power, nor does it 
render the power inert. On the contrary, the power is actively being 
powerful by engendering change or suffering change.
Thus, the relation between a power and its actuality is intrinsic 
to the power itself, in the way that, for example, the relation of a 
girl to the woman she becomes is intrinsic to that person.26 It is a 
common assumption, after Aristotle, that powers are defined in 
terms of their actuality. Contemporary power ontologies take the 
manifestation of a power to be a further power, thereby establishing 
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a network of relations whereby each power is defined in terms of 
its relations to something different from itself, namely other pow-
ers. By contrast, on Aristotle’s view the actuality of a power is not 
another power that the original power is related to. (The actuality 
of the power to heat is the power’s heating up something else—and 
not another power.) It follows that Aristotle’s ontology is not rela-
tional; a power is not defined in terms of its relation to other powers. 
Rather, a power is defined in terms of its own state of activation, 
which is an intrinsic state of the power itself.
It remains now to investigate whether powers for Aristotle have 
an essentially relational nature on account of their dependence on 
other powers for their activation. To consider this point, we need 
to look at the conditions for activation of powers that Aristotle sets 
out. For Aristotle, the activation of causal powers requires two sets 
of conditions to obtain. On the one hand there is a variety of what 
we would call enabling conditions pertaining to the right time, the 
right situation, the right external conditions. Aristotle summarizes 
them in saying that the mover is capable of something ‘at some time 
in some way (with all the other qualifications which must be present 
in the definition)’ (Met. 1048a1–2). On the other hand, he collec-
tively describes what triggers powers in the right circumstances into 
causal activity generically, in terms of ‘contact’ between powers:
To act on the movable as such is just to move it. But this it does 
by contact, so that at the same time it [the mover] is also acted 
on. Hence motion is the fulfilment of the movable as movable, 
the cause being contact with what can move, so that the mover 
is also acted on. (Phys. 202a5–9)
τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖν 
ἐστι· τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ θίξει, ὥστε ἅμα καὶ πάσχει· διὸ ἡ κίνησις 
ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν, συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο θίξει τοῦ 
κινητικοῦ, ὥσθ’ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει.
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What we learn from this passage (and others already quoted) is the 
following. First, powers for Aristotle are dependent entities. As we 
will see in more detail later in this chapter, for Aristotle powers are 
co-activated with their partner-powers. For example A’s power to 
heat (p) requires B’s capacity to get hotter (p’) in order to be able 
to achieve its manifestation, that is, heating. Hence, every power 
is dependent on other powers for actualizing its nature by reach-
ing its full activation state. But dependence is not a relation; it is 
rather a condition for existence.27 Thus, as we will see later in the 
chapter, powers are not for Aristotle relations or relational proper-
ties. Secondly, contact is the triggering condition, with all the other 
conditions mentioned in the definition determining the enabling 
conditions for causal efficacy to take place. It is therefore impor-
tant to understand what is involved in the contact between the 
active power and the passive power it operates on. Aristotle tells 
us that: ‘Things are said to be in contact when their extremities are 
together’ (Physics 226b23). He further explains that, ‘Things are 
said to be together in place when they are in one primary place and 
to be apart when they are in different places’28 (Physics 226a21–3). 
So things that are in contact have their extremities in the same 
place. For the purposes of causation, having the extremities in the 
same place will have to be understood as either touching or being 
in proximity. (It must have been as clear to everybody in antiquity 
as it is to us that there is causal impact even when things are merely 
proximate, namely, in the same place in the sense of same spatial 
region.) For example, proximity to a fire is sufficient for heating, 
and even for catching fire. So for Aristotle ‘contact’ is a key factor 
for causal efficacy. It does entail a type of proximity or sameness 
of place, but more importantly, in a causal context, it has come to 
mean, for him, trigger of the change, allowing that there is some kind 
of ‘touching’ even in situations where the touching is not physical 
and not even reciprocal:
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Thu Mar 13 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199326006_Marmodoro.indd   22 3/13/2014   6:00:44 PM
t h e  m e t A P h y s I C A l  F o u n d A t I o n s  o F  P e r C e P t I o n
23
If anything imparts motion without itself being moved, it may 
touch the moved and yet itself be touched by nothing—for we 
say sometimes that the man who grieves us touches us, but not 
that we touch him. (GC 323a31–33)
Ὥστε εἴ τι κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἂν ἅπτοιτο τοῦ 
κινητοῦ, ἐκείνου δὲ οὐδέν· φαμὲν γὰρ ἐνίοτε τὸν λυποῦντα 
ἅπτεσθαι ἡμῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ἐκείνου.
To recapitulate, the conditions under which the actualization of 
powers takes place are determined in the very definition of the pow-
ers. The definition of a power specifies the type of power it is, namely 
what it is that it can bring about or suffer; the appropriate occasion 
on which the power can do this; the way in which it can do it; and 
any other conditions that need to obtain for it to do what it does. 
When all the conditions set out in the definition are met, including 
the appropriate pair of powers coming into contact, in the relevant 
sense of contact for the type of power they are, then necessarily the 
agent power acts on the passive power and brings about its effect:
Since that which is capable is capable of something and 
at some time in some way—with all the other qualifica-
tions which must be present in the definition, . . . as regards 
potentialities of [those things that are non-rational, (e.g., 
fire)] . . . when the agent and the patient meet in the way 
appropriate to the potentiality in question, the one must act 
and the other be acted on . . . For the non-rational potenti-
alities are all productive of one effect each. (Met. 1047b35–
1048a8; my emphasis)
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατὸν τὶ δυνατὸν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πὼς καὶ ὅσα 
ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ λόγον 
δύναται κινεῖν καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν μετὰ λόγου, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα 
καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἄλογοι, κἀκείνας μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐμψύχῳ εἶναι 
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ταύτας δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας δυνάμεις ἀνάγκη, ὅταν 
ὡς δύνανται τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν πλησιάζωσι, τὸ μὲν 
ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκείνας δ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη·
The modality is natural necessity, stemming from the nature of the pow-
ers themselves. When Aristotle says, in the quotation above, that 
‘when the agent and the patient meet in the way appropriate to the 
potentiality in question, the one must act and the other be acted 
on’ he is stating what is in effect a most general law of nature. That 
is, he is stating what a power is in terms of how it behaves. When 
nature follows its course, according to Aristotle, it develops as its 
potentiality dictates, unless something external interferes. He says 
about the natural development of an organism (e.g., an acorn) in 
Book VIII of the Metaphysics:
In the cases in which the source of the becoming is in the very 
thing which comes to be, a thing is potentially all those things 
which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders it. (Met. 
1049a12–14)
καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι [ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως], [τοῦτο 
δυνάμει] ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται δι’ αὐτοῦ.
This is how nature operates:  there are physical tendencies, which 
unfold, unless something gets in their way and prevents their course. 
This may happen in the case of causal interaction, or in the case of 
the natural development of organisms according to their nature. 
This is why Aristotle describes the latter as being such-and-such for 
the most part in Book VI of the Metaphysics:
Physics must be a theoretical science, but it will theorize 
about such being as admits of being moved, and about 
substance-as-defined for the most part. (Met. 1025b26–28)
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ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρητική τις ἂν εἴη, ἀλλὰ θεωρητικὴ περὶ 
τοιοῦτον ὂν ὅ ἐστι δυνατὸν κινεῖσθαι, καὶ περὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ 
τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ . . . 
Both change and development are the results of unfolding potenti-
alities, which follow their own course, for the most part, if nothing 
hinders.
Aristotle’s characterization of this type of physical modal-
ity is a landmark in metaphysics, demarcating what has come to 
be thought of as physical necessity.29 Again in the Metaphysics, 
Aristotle explains the notion of being for the most part, contrasting 
it to absolute necessity, as follows:
Since, among things which are, some are always in the same 
state and are of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compul-
sion but that which we assert of things because they cannot be 
otherwise), and some are not of necessity, nor always, but for 
the most part . . . For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry 
and cold weather, we say this is an accident, but not if there is 
sultry heat, because the latter is always or for the most part so, 
but not the former. (Met. 1026b27–35, my emphasis)
—ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα καὶ 
ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ τῆς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγομένης ἀλλ’ ἣν λέγομεν 
τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ’ 
ἀεί, ὡς δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, αὕτη ἀρχὴ καὶ αὕτη αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ 
συμβεβηκός· ὃ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ μήτ’ ἀεὶ μήθ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ . . . οἷον ἐπὶ 
κυνὶ ἂν χειμὼν γένηται καὶ ψῦχος, τοῦτο συμβῆναί φαμεν, ἀλλ’ 
οὐκ ἂν πνῖγος καὶ ἀλέα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ δ’ οὔ.
What characterizes the notion of being for the most part is regular-
ity, the type of regularity that one finds in nature, under the domain 
of natural laws, which are not exceptionless.30
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To recapitulate the discussion so far, causal change for Aristotle 
involves the mutual activation of active and passive powers, brought 
about by the contact between ontologically interdependent pairs of 
powers, such as what can heat and what can be heated. The mutual 
activation of interdependent powers may result either in activity 
(e.g. seeing) or in a process of change (e.g., being heated) All that 
happens in Aristotle’s world is that powers in potentiality come 
to be activated, either as agents of change or as patients of change. 
What is distinctive about the view (in contrast with the versions in 
contemporary metaphysics) is that it takes the activation of a causal 
power to be the exercise of that power (i.e., an activity or process).
1.4 r el At Ions A n d r el At I v e s
Powers for Aristotle are not relational properties. There is no (exter-
nal) relation connecting a power in potentiality to its actuality (rather, 
the actuality is the very same power in a different state, namely 
engaged in an activity). There are good reasons for not treating pow-
ers as relations, even if Aristotle does not discuss them explicitly. 
On the one hand, if a power is defined in terms of its actuality, where 
the definition defines the power’s nature (e.g., the power to heat) it 
should be the case that the power is one with its essential nature; the 
essential nature of a power should not be a different entity to which 
the power is related. This we know from Aristotle’s arguments in 
Metaphysics VIII 6. Nor should a power only tend towards its pow-
erfulness—as if its powerfulness were external to the power itself—
because this latter view would not make philosophical sense. That is, 
it would divide a power from what it is. Furthermore, there is no rela-
tion connecting mutually dependent powers. Rather, for Aristotle 
powers are relatives. Aristotle’s powers are dependent on other pow-
ers in order to be activated, but ontological dependence is grounded 
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on monadic properties, such as ‘y being a father’ and ‘x being an off-
spring’, that belong to interdependent entities. Aristotle’s powers 
are not related to other powers through polyadic relations, such as ‘x 
being the father of y’. Aristotle explained the ontological dependence 
between relatives reductively, as a counterfactual dependence (e.g., if 
there is no master there is no slave).31 If we apply this understanding 
of ontological dependence to the case of causal relata, it follows that 
taking causal relata as ontologically interdependent amounts to the 
view that if there is no patient of change, there is no cause of change 
(there is no power to heat if there is no power for being heated up).32 
I will begin by offering what I think is the rationale for this approach, 
by sketching an intuition that stems from Aristotelian metaphysical 
principles.33 I submit that this rationale motivates Aristotle’s reduc-
tive account of relations in terms of monadic properties.
We know from Aristotle’s Categories (chapter 1) and from the 
Metaphysics (book VII  chapter  4) that even incidental proper-
ties (e.g., being pale, or being hot) have essences and definitions. 
Furthermore, properties cannot exist unattached, on their own, 
but they have to belong to a subject (see Categories chapter 2). If we 
then consider a relation between two things, for example, Marco 
being the father of Pietro, and we try to think of this relation as a 
single polyadic property that conjoins the two, Marco and Pietro, 
decisive difficulties follow. On the one hand, this polyadic property 
would belong to both subjects, since it can only exist by belonging 
to something(s) as subject, and both subjects have a claim to it by 
being conjoined by it. On the other hand, although Marco is related 
to Pietro as a father, Pietro is not related to Marco as a father, but 
as a son; hence, either the polyadic property would belong to Pietro 
without being true of him; or the polyadic property would have 
two different natures, endowing each of the two conjoined enti-
ties with different qualifications, of being a father and being a son, 
which is incompatible with the property being one and the same 
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property (i.e., relation). The asymmetry of the relation introduces 
a plurality of natures; the relation is these natures, and this plurality 
undermines its oneness. Conceiving of relations as polyadic prop-
erties was not even entertained by Aristotle. For Aristotle, what we 
consider relations are accounted for in terms of monadic properties 
that are ontologically interdependent—that is, relatives. They are 
monadic properties of a special kind, which he called the pros ti (the 
‘toward something’) type of property: such properties in themselves 
point toward something other than themselves. Thus, Aristotle says:
We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they 
are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to 
something else. For example, what is larger is called what it is than 
something else (it is called larger than something); and what is 
double is called what it is of something else (it is called double of 
something); similarly with all other such cases. (Cat. 6a36–b2)
Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων 
εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον· οἷον τὸ μεῖζον 
τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς γὰρ μεῖζον λέγεται,— 
καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἑτέρου λέγεται τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν, —τινὸς γὰρ 
διπλάσιον λέγεται·— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.
(Aristotle does not distinguish between relatives and relations. 
I take it this is for the reason given above: that neither relatives nor 
(asymmetric) relations can be single polyadic properties with a 
single nature belonging to each of the two relata it is true of.) What 
does Aristotle mean by taking relatives to be pros ti—toward some-
thing? He explains it as follows:
All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that recip-
rocate. For example the slave is called slave of a master and the 
master is called master of a slave (Cat. 6b28–30)
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Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον 
ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου λέγεται δοῦλος καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου 
δεσπότης λέγεται . . . 
Pros ti properties are monadic properties such that their manifesta-
tion or activation depends counterfactually on the activation of their 
correlatives. Someone is actually a master only if there is a slave of 
whom he is master, and vice versa for the slave. The relation between 
the reciprocating correlatives is not a linguistic or a semantic rela-
tion. It is an ontological interdependence, as Aristotle states clearly:
If there is no master, there is no slave either . . . When there is a 
slave there is a master; and similarly with the others [sc. other 
relatives] Also, each carries the other to destruction; for if there 
is not a double there is not a half, and if there is not a half if there 
is not a double. So too with other such cases. (Cat. 7b5–22)
μὴ γὰρ ὄντος δεσπότου οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν . . . καὶ δούλου 
ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ 
συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστι διπλάσιον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα.
So the ‘pointing’ nature of relatives is Aristotle’s way of depicting 
ontological dependence. This is what binds monadic properties 
into reciprocal pairs for their activation (e.g., being a master and 
being a slave). But ontological dependence is not a polyadic relation 
between relata. Just as there is no polyadic connection binding a 
species to its genus, in spite of their ontological interdependence, 
similarly, for Aristotle, there is no polyadic connection binding 
one activated monadic property to its correlative property.34 The 
same holds for the relation between matter and form, and subject 
and property, where Aristotle is explicit that there is no (polyadic) 
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entity unifying them into one.35 The relation between the recipro-
cating correlatives is not a linguistic or a semantic relation. It is an 
ontological relation of interdependence, as Aristotle states clearly 
in the last passage quoted. So the ‘pointing’ nature of relatives is 
Aristotle’s way of depicting ontological dependence. This is what 
binds relative monadic properties into reciprocal pairs (e.g., being 
a master and being a slave): that the correlatives are ontologically 
interdependent. The last quotation above is important for under-
standing Aristotle’s notion of dependence, as it applies to relata. He 
says that each relatum carries the other relatum ‘to destruction’. He 
is therefore clearly describing an existential dependence between 
relata:  if there is no master there is no slave. (Some dependencies 
are expressed in generic terms, and some in specific terms, with the 
dependencies specified respectively.)36
1.5 C AusAt Ion w It hou t glu e
The two pillars of Aristotle’s theory of causation are his account 
of powers and his reductive account of relations. In a nutshell, 
for Aristotle, causation is the activation of reciprocal causal powers. 
Aristotle considers causal powers as relatives; namely, the agent and 
patient in a causal pair are causal relatives. In Metaphysics book V 
Aristotle explains the term ‘relative’ or ‘relation’ as follows:
Things are relative [pros ti] (1) as double to half, and treble to 
a third, . . . and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded; 
(2)  as that which can heat to that which can be heated, and 
that which can cut to that which can be cut, and in general the 
active to the passive; (3) as the measurable to the measure, and 
the knowable to knowledge, and the perceptible to perception. 
(Met. 1020b26–32, my emphasis)
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